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a b s t r a c t
Forecasting the outcomes of national elections has become established practice in several
democracies. In the present paper, we develop an economic voting model for forecasting
the future success of the Austrian ‘grand coalition’, i.e., the joint electoral success of the
twomainstream parties SPOE and OEVP, at the 2013 Austrian Parliamentary Elections. Our
main argument is that the success of both parties is strongly tied to the accomplishments
of the Austrian system of corporatism, that is, the Social Partnership (Sozialpartnerschaft),
in providing economic prosperity. Using data from Austrian national elections between
1953 and 2008 (n = 18), we rely on the following predictors in our forecasting model:
(1) unemployment rates, (2) previous incumbency of the two parties, and (3) dealignment
over time. We conclude that, in general, the two mainstream parties benefit considerably
from lowunemployment rates, and areweakenedwhenever they have previously formed a
coalition government. Further, we show that they have gradually been losing a good share
of their voter basis over recent decades.
© 2013 International Institute of Forecasters. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.s. P1. Introduction
Forecasts of Austrian national elections have tradition-
ally relied upon classical opinion polls, conducted several
days or weeks ahead of an election, or on political stock-
markets (Filzmaier, Beyrl, Hauser, & Huber, 2003; Hofin-
ger & Ogris, 2002). In this paper, we forecast the outcome
of the 2013 Austrian parliamentary elections by means of
a macroeconomic voting model. While this is established
practice in other countries like the US (e.g. Lewis-Beck &
Tien, 2008; Norpoth, 2004), France (e.g. Foucault &Nadeau,
2012), and Great Britain (e.g. Lebo &Norpoth, 2011; Lewis-
Beck, Nadeau, & Bélanger, 2004; Sanders, 2005), this kind
of forecasting is a novelty to the Austrian case. However,
there has been one cross-country comparative forecast-
ing model for radical right parties in Europe, by Evans and
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2013.07.011Ivaldi (2010), which included Austria as a case. Relying
on incumbency, unemployment and the number of asy-
lum seekers, they accurately predicted the vote share of
the Austrian Freedom Party (FPOE) in 2008. Another study,
by Neck and Karbuz (1997), estimated a popularity func-
tion for Austrian parties by drawing upon macroeconomic
data (unemployment, inflation, income growth). However,
no efforts have been undertaken to model a vote function
or to forecast the vote shares of the mainstream Austrian
parties based on political and economic indicators.
Thus, our contribution is fourfold. First, we will close
this research gap and develop a politico-economic voting
model for forecasting the joint success of the two main-
stream parties, SPOE (Social Democrats) and OEVP (Peo-
ple’s Party), the so-called ‘grand coalition’, at the 2013
national election. In particular, we ask whether they will
manage to keep the absolute majority of votes beyond
2013. Second, we will add new input to the challenges of
developing electoral vote forecasts for multiparty systems.
The majority of the forecasting models which have been
ublished by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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tems like the US or Great Britain, where it is common for
one single party to form the government, and where it can
be determined unambiguously as to who should be held
accountable for economic success or failure. Austria, on the
other hand, is a multiparty systemwhere various different
party coalitions tend to form the government, and where
economic accountability is difficult to attribute. Bellucci
(2010), Hooghe and Dassonneville (2012), Norpoth and
Gschwend (2010), Magalhães and Aguiar-Conraria (2009)
and Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck (2009) have already set
forth models for various multiparty systems, and have de-
veloped individual solutions by drawing upon the respec-
tive country-specific circumstances. We will enrich this
branch of thinking by developing yet another way of cop-
ing with multiparty forecasting. Instead of modeling the
vote shares of the individual governing parties, we model
the vote share of the grand coalition. In doing this, we are
drawing upon the Austrian-specific circumstance of cor-
poratism, arguing that the joint success and economic ac-
countability of the grand coalition parties SPOE and OEVP
can be traced back to the way in which they intertwine
in their Social Partnership arrangements. Third, we will
postulate a parsimonious, politico-economic voting model
that gets alongwithout the frequently-used party popular-
ity measure, which is drawn from opinion polls. Thus, we
do not rely on opinion polls, but use amodel that is created
from objective political and macroeconomic data. Fourth,
we develop a forecasting model with a comparatively long
lead time of up to one year.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we will
discuss the theoretical underpinnings of our economic
voting model and address the peculiarities of the Austrian
Social Partnershipwhichhelp us to overcome the problems
in relation to multiparty forecasts. In Section 3, we will
specify the details and expectations of ourmodel. Section 4
will elaborate on the data sources used in Section 5, where
the voting model is fitted to the past elections. Finally, in
Section 6, we will forecast the combined vote share of the
SPOE and the OEVP for the 2013 elections. We conclude by
summarizing our findings.
2. Theory: economic voting and social partnership
When asked about the most important problem facing
their country today, many survey respondents indicate
that the economy and/or concerns about unemployment
are the most important issues to them. A considerable
branch of the voting literature, i.e., the economic voting
literature (Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Fiorina, 1981; Key,
1966), builds on this pronouncement. This finding has
also been confirmed for Austria. More than half of the
respondents in the 2009 Austrian National Election Study
(56%) indicated that either unemployment or the economy
mattered most to them (see AUTNES, 2009). Beyond the
topicality of the economic crisis at this time, these finding
are also supported by the findings of other past surveys
(see Müller, 2000, p. 42).
Thus, the state of the economy matters to citizens,
and they are comfortable when prosperity is enhanced,economic growth is advanced, and unemployment is de-
creased. The responsibility hypothesis of economic voting
theory assumes that voters reward or punish parties for the
state of the economy, that is, economic prosperity or reces-
sion, at the poll. It is assumed that they can identify who is
responsible for the recent economic ups and downs, and
accordingly either support this party at the poll or let it
down. This last point poses a problem for the forecasting
of vote shares in multi-party systems (Anderson, 2010). In
two-party or majoritarian systems, where the government
generally consists of only one party, the government’s ac-
countability for the state of the economy can easily be as-
signed to a single party. However, in multiparty systems
where party coalitions frequently form the government, it
is still questionable as to which party the voters will hold
accountable at the ballot box.
We are by no means the first to recognize that multi-
party systems pose a challenge for election forecasting. For
instance, Hooghe and Dassonneville (2012) and Norpoth
and Gschwend (2010) have already forecasted election
outcomes in proportional representative systems. Hooghe
and Dassonneville (2012) overcame the multi-party prob-
lem by forecasting the vote-share for incumbent parties
in general, treating all parties that participated in a coali-
tion as an incumbent party on an equal footing, and assum-
ing that they are all held equally responsible by the voters
on election day. This approach requires some sort of re-
peatedly collected party approval ratemeasure for leveling
out differences in party sizes, which we do not have avail-
able for Austria beyond the 1990s. In contrast, Norpoth and
Gschwend (2010) met the multiparty challenge using only
party-specific variables, no contextual data such as eco-
nomic well-being. That is, they regress the vote share of
every governing coalition only on the characteristics of this
very coalition, not on context-specific variables. This, how-
ever, is incompatible with our economic vote idea, which
assumes that voters blame the incumbent government for
economic failure or success.
Thus, in order to solve the multiparty challenge of eco-
nomic voting in Austria, one has to figure out who is seen
as responsible for the state of the economy. In other words,
who are the voters most likely to hold responsible for eco-
nomic developments? As Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000,
p.119) put it, ‘‘In a multi-party system, the economic voter
may target a whole coalition, a party within the coalition,
or even assign a particular economic policy to a particu-
lar party. Once ‘responsibility’ is properly understood, it
can be properly modeled [. . . ]’’. We argue that, in order to
properly understand the responsibility for economic de-
velopments in Austria, it is important to consider the actual
power over the economy. To a large extent, this power is
held within the discretion of the Austrian system of corpo-
ratism, that is, the Social Partnership (Sozialpartnerschaft).1
The Social Partnership, more than any government, has a
strong influence on a wide range of economic (and social)
1 This institutionalized cooperation consists of representatives from
the Trade Union Federation (ÖGB), the Federal Economic Chamber
(WKÖ), the Federal Chamber of Labour (BAK), and the Chamber
of Agriculture (LK). See http://www.sozialpartner.at/sozialpartner/
Sozialpartnerschaft_mission_en.pdf.
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of their policies (Lewis, 2002; Marterbauer, 2005). When
it comes to the permanent body of the corporatist con-
sent and its influence on the country’s economic prosper-
ity, Austria is doubtlessly a special case, as has frequently
been noted (e.g. Lewis, 2002). Unlike virtually all other cor-
poratist systems, the influence of the representational or-
ganizations of labor and employers in Austria goes well
beyond conventional consensus-seeking or policy concer-
tation, and extends to what Tálos and Kittel (2002) term
‘policy accordation’. That is to say, the labor and employer
associations not only seek consensus in negotiations with
the government, but actually draft policy propositions on a
wide range of socioeconomic issues, which are then either
submitted directly to the Parliament or passed through the
Cabinet to the Parliament. Either way, the propositions re-
main largely unchanged, and are adopted as suggested by
the associations (Tálos, 2005).
Now, one could argue that the Social Partnership has
forfeited its influence in the past two decades compared
to the ‘golden age’ of the 1960s or 1970s, meaning that
its responsibility for the economic well-being of the coun-
try would be questionable. Indeed, the increasing interna-
tionalization, and in particular the Europeanization, of the
economy, leaving national actors with lesser policy discre-
tion, has led authors to speculate about the end of corpo-
ratism (Crepaz, 1994; Tálos, 2005). However, we believe
that the responsibility assumption still holds, for two rea-
sons. First, the political developments of the 1990s have
not necessarily led to an erosion of corporatist power, but
rather to a transformation. As Heinisch (2000) points out,
the Austrian Social Partnership has fared pretty well in
adapting to the altered challenges of internationalization,
and rather strengthened its position in the 1990s. He con-
cludes that the corporatist partners have actually become a
driving force of Austria’s EU accession, and expanded their
reach by diversifying into non-traditional policy fields. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, formal changes in power do
not prevent citizens from believing that the Social Part-
nership still matters. There is some evidence that popular
opinion still sees the Social Partnership as being advanta-
geous for Austria, and citizens tend to expect the institu-
tion to exert a fair amount of influence (Heinisch, 2000;
Kittel, 2000; Tálos, 2005, pp. 210f; Tálos & Kittel, 2002).
This implies that people are aware of the Social Partner-
ship’s functioning and have certain expectations as to its
outcome. Thus, they will ascribe responsibility to the So-
cial Partnership bothwhen it delivers economicwell-being
and when it fails to do so.
Thus, we properly understand the responsibility for
economic prosperity as being tied to the Social Partner-
ship. However, this does not immediately help us in ef-
fectively modeling economic responsibility. After all, the
Social Partnership is an extra-parliamentary institution,
or what Duch and Stevenson (2008, p. 178) call a ‘non-
electorally dependent decision maker’, which cannot be
held directly accountable at the ballot box. However, the
institutionalized co-operation is historically very closely
linked to the two mainstream Austrian parties, with the
OEVP representing the employer organizations and the
SPOE representing the employee organizations. Leadingrepresentatives of the corporatist associations regularly
become Members of Parliament for one of the two par-
ties, and sometimes they are even assigned governmen-
tal positions; either way, they are strong opinion lead-
ers within their parties. Thus, the voters can blame or re-
ward the parties for the failures or achievements of the So-
cial Partnership. We assume that voters blame the SPOE
and OEVP jointly at the ballot box when economic matters
are working unsatisfactorily, and thus, we model the com-
bined vote share of these two parties as a function of the
economic prosperity within the country.2 As can be seen in
Table A.1, the combined vote share of the SPOE and OEVP
was very high in the 1960s and 1970s, when the country
was experiencing considerable economic growth and eco-
nomic stability, forwhich the corporatist system is conven-
tionally held responsible (Gerlich, Grande, &Müller, 1988).
With the decelerating economic growth over the subse-
quent decades, some voters lost their faith in the compe-
tence of the SPOE and OEVP and their party-affiliated cor-
poratist organizations in directing the country’s economy
to sufficient economic prosperity, and the combined vote
share decreased accordingly.
3. Specifying the model
After having made a case for the basic logic of our
model, i.e., the SPOE and OEVP are jointly held responsible
for economic failure and success, we will now specify it in
more detail. Specifically, our independent variables are un-
employment, incumbency, and a measure for progressing
partisan dealignment.
We build our model upon unemployment as the main
economic measure, for two reasons. On the one hand, we
contend that the unemployment rate is a good indicator
of the general economic prosperity within a country. This
measure frequently fares well in forecast models. While
Lewis-Beck and Tien (2005), for example, use jobs in their
(Jobs) model for the US, Arzheimer and Evans (2010) and
Foucault and Nadeau (2012) draw upon unemployment
as an economic indicator for forecasting French national
elections, as do Magalhães, Aguiar-Conraria, and Lewis-
Beck (2012) for Spanish elections. Second, we make a case
on the voters’ individual evaluations. As our argument is
that people blame the SPOE and the OEVP for the success
of the institutionalized employer/employee co-operation,
it seems reasonable to choose an indicatorwhich the Social
Partnership influences. Furthermore, as we have seen
above, people consider unemployment to be a pressing
issue—not only those who are directly concerned by it,
but also those who actually have jobs. When jobs are
scarce, wages are not raised and it is difficult to change
employment positions so as to build one’s career. Thus,
people generate a general bad mood when talking among
themselves about bad economic prospects, andwe assume
that voters follow this general mood and weaken the two
mainstream parties as unemployment increases.
2 Note that, looking at the past 18 elections (1953–2008), the vote
shares of the SPOE and the OEVP have been relatively closely correlated
(r = 0.74).
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rate as an indicator of economic prosperity, and we expect
the relationship between the unemployment rate and the
support for the mainstream parties to be negative: the
higher the unemployment rate, the fewer voteswill be cast
for the grand coalition and the more protest votes will be
gained by other (opposition) parties. We argue that the
causal link is primarily through the Social Partnership; that
is, the parties which represent employers and employees
are rewarded or punished by the voter for the state of
the economy. However, it seems reasonable to assume
that this effect will matter more (or only) if both parties
were incumbent in the previous term and formed a so-
called ‘grand coalition’. If one of the two parties was an
opposition party, it could recover and regain votes from the
other party again. Technically speaking, we will therefore
interact the unemployment rate with a variable indicating
grand coalition incumbency.3
Further, we argue that incumbency of the two parties it-
self can have a negative effect on vote shares. We argue
that the popularity of the coalition parties dwindles when
they are in office, what Norpoth (1991) terms ‘incumbency
fatigue’. In particular, their practice of the Proporz (propor-
tional) system is assumed to tire out the voters. Jobs in
nationalized industries and administration, including the
public service broadcaster (ORF), are usually shared among
the SPOE and the OEVP (e.g. Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013). This
practice has often been criticized as intransparent, unjust,
and inflexible, andmay therefore harm their success in the
subsequent election. Note, however, that we do not make
specific hypotheses about the leading party in a grand
coalition government. That is, we implicitly assume equal-
ity in the attribution of responsibility. Further, when look-
ing at our interaction hypothesis, we have good reason to
believe that there should be no impact of incumbency if
unemployment rates approach zero.
Finally, we have to make allowances for the steady par-
tisan dealignment (see Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000) in our
model, which has been affecting the baseline vote share
of the two mainstream parties since the 1950s. In other
words, it is very unlikely that, ceteris paribus, the two par-
ties will gain the same vote shares today as they did in
the 1960s or 1970s. While Austria used to be character-
ized by high rates of party membership and a strong party
identification with the two mainstream parties, this phe-
nomenon has gradually decreased over time. Since we lack
reliable and updated data on issues like party member-
ship figures, voter survey data on partisan affect, or socio-
structural changes in classical cleavage groups in the
constituency,we insert a time index variable to capture the
dealignment effect (see for example Fair, 1988). Moreover,
a time index is often used for detrending time series data.
Though our time index is a rather rough indicator, it
serves as a proxy for otherwise unavailable data and can be
seen as the ‘common factor’ underlying several indicators
3 See the data on incumbency in Table A.1 in theAppendix. Besides one-
party governments (elected 1966–1979), therewere four other coalitions,
namely SPOE/FPOE (elected 1983, 1986), and OEVP/FPOE (elected 1999,
2002). However, it has never occurred that neither of the two parties
participated in the government.of dealignment. Indeed, the available figures (see Fig. 1)
show that party identification in Austria has been declining
since the mid-1950s, while swing voting is on the rise.
Thus, several social changes in the constituency suggest
that there has been a severe and continuous decline in
the voter basis of both the SPOE and the OEVP that is still
ongoing. It is not yet clear when this decline will reach
a preliminary bottom. Hence, once the pattern in decline
changes (at some stage in the future), forecasting with the
present model will become inaccurate.
4. Data
We have compiled data for the past eighteen parlia-
mentary elections, going back to the election of 1953 (n =
18) and covering the elections of 1953, 1956, 1959, 1962,
1966, 1970, 1971, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1994,
1995, 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2008. As has already been
mentioned, we include macroeconomic indicators as well
as political and institutional factors, as is frequently done
in economic voting forecasting models (Campbell, 2012;
Lewis-Beck, 2005). We use data on the electoral success
of the parties, as well as incumbency, which is taken from
the official bulletin of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior
(BMI).4 Unemployment rates are provided by the Austrian
National Bank (OeNB).5 Since we use the unemployment
rate as our main independent variable for economic vot-
ing, we are limited by the unavailability of this indicator
before the 1950s. However, this is not really a problem,
in the sense that the two post-WWII elections (1945 and
1949) represent rather atypical cases. The unemployment
rate, i.e., the annual average, is measured with a lag time
of one year before each election. We thus assume that the
economic conditions of the past yearwill have a lagged im-
pact on future vote choices. We do not consider the de-
velopment over a longer period, since voters are usually
assumed to have relatively short time horizonswith regard
to economic evaluations (see Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000).
In our model, we finally include the combined vote
share of the two parties as our dependent variable (M =
80.95, S.D. = 12.90, Min = 55.24, Max = 93.37), to-
gether with the unemployment rate in the year before the
election (y − 1) (M = 4.77, S.D. = 2.00, Min = 1.50,
Max = 7.50), an interaction of unemployment and a joint
incumbency of SPOE and OEVP in the previous election (in-
cumbent in 56% of the elections), as well as a time index
variable (see for example Fair, 1988). The time index vari-
able acts as a control for the assumed dealignment process
and the increased volatility of the electorate at each elec-
tion.We also tried tomodel the loss of themainstreampar-
ties’ voter basis using other proxies for long-term changes
in partisanship, such as amoving average of the lagged vote
shares of previous elections, as was suggested by Norpoth
and Gschwend (2010). However, the lagged vote shares
follow a curvilinear pattern that goes hand in hand with
low unemployment rates in the 1970s, and hence, cannot
4 http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_wahlen.
5 http://www.oenb.at/en/stat_melders/datenangebot/datenangebot.
jsp.
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Source:Müller, Plasser, and Ulram (1999, p. 206); Plasser, Ulram, and Seeber (2007, p. 169).Fig. 2. Scatterplots for independent variables in the model (1= incumbent, 0= not incumbent).be considered an independent trend. Rather, an inspec-
tion of themodel residuals suggests that there is an almost
linear, time-dependent trend (serious autocorrelation) in
vote shares that is explained by neither unemployment nor
incumbency. Nevertheless, it is important to note that our
time index variable serves only as an approximation for a
societal trend which we can observe for the previous elec-
tions, and which we assume will also be true for the next
election. Hence, we do not encourage the making of pre-
dictions based on this index variable for the infinite future,
as this will result in a natural extinction of the two parties.
Rather, this trend must be updated with each future elec-
tion.
In order to achieve familiarity with the data, we pro-
vide bivariate scatterplots (Fig. 2) for the main variables in
our model for all of the election years under consideration.
Note that the markers represent the dummy variable on
the previous incumbency (1 = incumbent, 0 = not in-
cumbent) of both parties.
In the graph, we see several important relationships us-
ing bivariate associations: the combined vote share has
been decreasing since the mid-1970s, though in a curvi-
linear shape, while the unemployment rate was relativelyhigh in the 1950s and 1960s, was very low in the mid-
1970s, and has been increasing again since the 1980s. Also,
most importantly, vote shares are lower at higher unem-
ployment rates. Finally, there is a certain pattern of lower
vote shares when both parties were previously the incum-
bents.
5. Models and results
It is common practice to require a forecasting model
to satisfy four main criteria: lead, parsimony, accuracy, and
reproducibility (Lewis-Beck, 2005). In what follows, wewill
address each of these points in turn. Since our aim is to
look into the future, our forecasting model must produce
good estimates at a considerable lead time. Thus, we use
the average unemployment rate of the year preceding an
election.6 Compared to other forecast models, this is an
6 We also checked whether deseasonalized unemployment rates (with
a constant seasonal pattern) would be more appropriate, using various
different lag times (2–6 months before each election). However, the
annual unemployment rate one year before each election produced the
most accurate prediction.
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OLS Estimates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Final model
b (S.E.) b (S.E.) b (S.E.) b (S.E.) b (S.E.) b (S.E.)
Unemployment rate (y− 1) −5.02**** −1.88*** −0.96* −0.82
(1.01) (0.49) (0.52) (0.47)
Incumbency SPOE-OEVP −10.96* −10.91**** −2.23
(5.68) (1.76) (3.44)
Election no. (index 1953= 0) −1.84**** −1.71**** −1.74**** −1.73****
(0.39) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14)
Unemployment · Incumbency −1.86** −2.26****
(0.67) (0.28)
Constant term 104.87**** 87.04**** 96.55**** 110.53**** 107.28**** 106.52****
(5.19) (4.23) (3.91) (1.97) (1.99) (1.59)
R2 0.61 0.19 0.58 0.95 0.97 0.97
Adj. R2 0.58 0.14 0.55 0.94 0.96 0.96
SEE 8.32 11.97 8.64 3.03 2.49 2.44
MAE 5.99 9.95 7.23 2.23 1.84 1.80
AIC 129.25 142.34 130.61 94.48 88.05 86.63
BIC 131.03 144.12 132.39 98.04 92.51 90.19
D–W statistic 0.83 0.23 0.82 2.27 2.39 2.19
n 18 18 18 18 18 18
Note: Two-tailed significance.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
**** p < 0.001.unusually long lead time, with predictions being possible
up to one year in advance (see Lewis-Beck, 2005, p.157).
In terms of parsimony, we try to use as few independent
variables as possible while fitting the forecast accurately.
The respective data can be found in the Appendix, to
enable themodel to be reproduced. Finally, the accuracy of a
forecast will be discussed in detail in the following section.
In what follows, we estimate the combined vote share
of SPOE and OEVP using our predictor variables for the
elections from 1953 till 2008 (n = 18). We estimate five
separate models, each time using ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions. The final model, which we use for mak-
ing the forecast, consists of the unemployment rate of the
year before the election (U), the joint incumbency of SPOE
+ OEVP (I), and an election index variable (E), with each
election being a discrete event in time (where 1953 = 0,
the first election in our data set). To cover the interac-
tion hypothesis mentioned earlier, we include an inter-
action term (U · I) which states that the effect of the
unemployment rate on the parties’ vote share is moder-
ated by their previous incumbency. Hence, our regression
equation reads as follows:
Vˆ = β0 + β1 · U + β2 · I + β3 · E + β4 · U · I. (1)
We compare the models and check whether the model
fit improves significantly when introducing independent
variables using classical fit measures. Table 1 below pro-
vides several indicators for the accuracy of the estimated
model. The R2 estimate gives the percentage of the vari-
ance which is accounted for by the predictor variables,
whereas the adjusted R2 is corrected for the sample size
and the number of predictors, and is thus a more conser-
vativemodel fitmeasure. Since the elections are not a sam-
ple in the traditional sense, the improvement in predic-
tion (R2) is regarded as a more suitable indicator of a vari-
able’s explanatory power than the standard errors of re-
gression coefficients. The Standard Error of Estimates (SEE)is seen as a good estimate of the average error in a predic-
tion, and is usually used to calculate a confidence interval
of the forecast (see Lewis-Beck, 2005, p. 153). We also re-
port the mean absolute error (MAE) of the forecast residu-
als. Lower AIC and BIC values indicate a relatively better
fit of the model to the data. Finally, the Durbin–Watson
(D–W) statistic informs us about issues of autocorrelation
in the time series data.
First, we ran a regression to test our model with regard
to party-specific effects (see Table A.2 in the Appendix).
Overall, the results tell us that the model works well for
predicting the combined vote share of both parties, and
also if we examine SPOE and OEVP incumbency and its in-
teractionwith unemployment separately.Wedemonstrate
that the total vote share is particularly diminished when-
ever both parties are incumbent. However, we expect an
interaction effect to be at work. Note that, in interaction
models, the main effects of one variable (x1) can be read as
the average effect if the other main variable (x2) was zero
(for a discussion, see Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006). To
prevent inefficiency (variance inflation) due to collinear-
ity, we omit the main effect of incumbency in the inter-
action model (β2 = 0), as there is strong theoretical
reason and empirical support to believe that there is no ef-
fect when the unemployment approaches zero. We show
that the unemployment effect reaches itsmaximum if both
parties were incumbent (sum of interaction effects). At the
same time, if only one of the two parties was in power, un-
employment has hardly any effect on the combined vote
share, as all of the effects basically balance out (main effect
plus one interaction effect). Since the interaction effects of
incumbency are statistically indistinguishable, we proceed
with the intended, and more parsimonious, model using
the shared incumbency.7
7 Note that using the model including party-specific incumbency gives
basically the same forecast results.
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analyses for our full model, i.e., the combined vote share,
in order to examine bivariate results as well (see Table 1).
We see that unemployment (Model 1), incumbency (Model
2), and the election index, i.e., going from one election
to the next (Model 3), all have a negative effect on the
combined vote share of the SPOE and OEVP, though other
factors are not controlled for. In particular, more than half
of the variance is accounted for by either unemployment
or a hypothesized linear trend in dealignment. The effects
of unemployment, incumbency, and the election index
also remain important after controlling for each other
(Model 4). That is, higher unemployment rates (around
−2%), having formed a grand coalition in the previous
election (around −11%), and a loss in the baseline vote
share in each consecutive election (around −2%) will all
harm the two parties. As has been mentioned in previous
sections, we would expect the effect of unemployment
to weigh more heavily if SPOE and OEVP were the
incumbent parties (Model 5). A variable representing this
interaction adds further explanatory power, and confirms
that unemployment rates will especially harm the parties
governing a coalition. Again, we see that incumbency
has no effect in this model if the unemployment rate
approaches zero. Still, we find some indication that higher
unemployment rates would have only a minor negative
effect on the combined vote share of the SPOEand theOEVP
if they were not both incumbent. We omit the main effect
of incumbency (β2 = 0) in our finalmodel to be used for an
accurate forecast (see the final model), also for theoretical
reasons. In doing so, we get more efficient estimates (we
reduce the collinearity due to the interaction terms) and
a better model fit.8 The final model performs very well
according to all of the fit and accuracy measures, showing
that a combination of high unemployment rates and being
incumbent (interaction term), together with a continuous
decline in partisan support, will reduce the combined vote
share of the two mainstream parties SPOE and OEVP.
In order to verify that we have estimated the actual
vote share reasonably well, we compare the actual vote
share to the model estimates, also using out-of-sample
errors, which occur if observations (i.e. elections) are
consecutively omitted from the data set (see Table 2). Both
the values for Cook’s D (D = 0.69), i.e., the influence
on the overall regression results, and the Dfbeta statistic,
i.e., the change in parameters when one case is excluded,
suggest that the 2006 election is somewhat troublesome.
The residuals (S.D. = 2.21, Min = −3.57, Max = 3.31)
indicate that the largest estimate is 3.57% off the actual
result. In particular, we see that the model performs worst
for the 1962 election. In general, the model also performs
somewhat worse in the aftermath of the coalition of OEVP
and FPOE (Freedom Party of Austria) (elections 2002 and
2006), with the latter suffering from the secession of the
newly founded party BZOE (Alliance for the Future of
Austria) at this time.
8 We stick to omitting the constitutive term of incumbency, as the
regression coefficient estimates and forecast results hardly change. Again,
model fit measures support the usefulness of this final model for
producing the forecasts.Table 2
Comparison of actual vote shares and model estimates (final model).
Year V Vˆ e oof ooe
2008 55.24 57.94 −2.70 59.30 −4.06
2006 69.67 72.78 −3.11 75.57 −5.91
2002 78.81 75.50 3.31 74.17 −2.54
1999 60.06 60.06 0.00 60.06 −0.00
1995 66.35 63.95 2.40 63.42 2.93
1994 62.59 64.76 −2.17 65.21 −2.62
1990 74.84 72.04 2.80 71.63 3.21
1986 84.42 85.24 −0.82 85.39 −0.97
1983 90.87 87.87 3.00 87.49 3.38
1979 92.93 90.92 2.01 90.50 2.43
1975 93.37 93.15 0.22 93.09 0.28
1971 93.15 94.15 −1.00 94.31 −1.16
1970 93.11 95.55 −2.44 95.95 −2.84
1966 90.91 91.27 −0.36 91.33 −0.42
1962 89.43 93.00 −3.57 93.66 −4.23
1959 88.98 87.34 1.64 86.99 1.99
1956 89.00 88.15 0.85 87.89 1.11
1953 83.37 83.42 −0.05 83.46 −0.09
Note: Actual vote share (V ), estimated vote share from the model (Vˆ ),
estimation residuals (e), out-of-sample forecast (oof ), and out-of-sample
error (ooe).
Fig. 3. Forecasts of vote shares according to polls.
Source: The data are from the polling institutes Gallup, Karmasin, Market,
Hajek, IMAS, Oekonsult, Spectra, and meinungsraum.at (n = 45, M =
51.38, S.D. = 2.03, Min = 44, Max = 57) (last entry: 26 July 2013).
6. Making the forecast
We move on to making a forecast for the 2013 election
(the 18th election, according to the time index variable),
using current labormarket data. The annual average unem-
ployment rate for the year 2012 was 7.0% (source: OeNB).
Drawing upon this scenario and including the current in-
cumbency of the two parties, we substitute the values into
our regression equation (Eq. (1)) as follows:
Vˆ = 106.52 − 0.82 · 7+ 0− 1.73 · 18
− 2.26 · 7 · 1 = 53.74. (2)
According to the final model, the two parties will gain
about 54% of the popular vote share in the coming election.
This is somewhat higher than current polls (since the
beginning of 2013) suggest (Fig. 3), as they predict that the
combined vote share will be around the 50% mark.
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We also provide estimates of the uncertainty of our
prediction. First, we provide 95% confidence intervals (CI),
which are computed from the SEE times the t-value at
given degrees of freedom:
CI = Vˆ ∓ SEE · tdf=14 = Vˆ ∓ 2.44 · 2.145. (3)
According to this calculation, the interval states with
95% confidence that the combined vote share of the two
parties will be between 49% and 59% in the next election.
Second, we use simulations to describe the results
of our statistical model. As was pointed out by King,
Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000), the estimates of the
regression parameters are not perfectly certain, but show
fluctuations and stochastic uncertainty. We can, however,
calculate forecasts using the point estimates and the
variance-covariance matrix of the estimates in our model.
King et al. (2000) show how this can be done.9 The main
difference in the simulation model is that it uses exact val-
ues for each independent variable (see Eq. (2)) rather than a
general uncertaintymeasure, such as the SEE.We use 1000
simulations to compute the expected values that incorpo-
rate these uncertainty components. Fig. 4 shows the den-
sity (distribution) of these expected values.
The predicted value for our forecast is equal to the
average of the expected predictions, i.e., roughly 53.7%. The
uncertainty range (95% CI) shows a lower bound of 50.5%
and an upper bound of 56.8%, which is somewhat smaller
than that estimated by means of the SEE method. We can
also use the simulation results to get a better picture of
the uncertainty of this forecast. 90% of the simulations
generated a value >50, which gives us the approximate
probability that the vote share will actually be larger than
50% (see King et al., 2000, p. 349), using the values of our
independent variables given in Eq. (2).
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we develop an economic voting forecast
model for the Austrian case. We basically draw upon the
unemployment rate and incumbency, as we lack a mea-
sure of party popularity with which to forecast the com-
9 We use the STATA package ‘clarify’, by King et al. (2000), to calculate
our predictions.ing elections. For this purpose, therefore, we used the
unemployment ratewith a long lead time of up to one year,
which allows us to predict the vote shares quite accurately.
Still, this is a quite extensive lead time, and future research
might investigate the impact of time in economic develop-
ments on voting in more depth.
Furthermore, we overcome the challenges which are
usually connected with multiparty forecasts by predicting
the joint vote share of the grand coalition parties SPOE and
OEVP.We argue that those parties will be held accountable
at the polls for economic ups and downs, as they are
the political representation of the Social Partnership. That
is, we maintain that when the economy prospers, voters
will be satisfied with the performance of the corporatist
organizations, and reward the two mainstream parties.
This effect is apparently stronger if the parties were
incumbent in the previous term, but is also traceable to a
very small degree if they were not.
According to our forecast, the next election will be very
close, with the combined vote share of the mainstream
parties SPOE and OEVP being only 3.7 points above the
50% mark. We are also highly confident that they will
not be able to reach the two-thirds majority which would
enable them to pass laws of constitutional status. At the
same time, we have to emphasize that a 50%majority does
not necessarily mean that the two parties ultimately will,
or indeed will be able to, form a governmental coalition.
This, of course, also depends on their political will and the
translation of vote shares into seats in parliament, which
in turn will be affected by the vote shares of the smaller
parties that do or do not reach the threshold necessary for
representation in Parliament.
Finally, we discuss some limitations. As is obvious, the
model uses a very rough measure of the ‘natural’ decline
in party support of the two mainstream parties since the
1950s. A more exact measure of the actual party support is
desirable in order to be able to cope with future changes
in the pattern of partisan dealignment. Furthermore,
our model depends on the assumptions that the Social
Partnership is perceived by the public as a decisive actor
in socioeconomic policy-making, and that the SPOE and
OEVP are held jointly responsible at the poll for the success
or failure of ‘policy accordation’. This conjecture has not
gone unchallenged (see Karlhofer & Tálos, 2005), and
our model may lose in predictive power as the Social
Partnership loses in political power. Notwithstanding this,
we have shown that lagged unemployment rates perform
very well in explaining the results of past elections since
1953. Thus, both mainstream parties make ground on low
unemployment rates, and thus depend on each other.
Acknowledgements
This research is conducted under the auspices of the
Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES), a National Re-
search Network (NFN) sponsored by the Austrian Research
Fund (FWF) (S10903-G11). A previous version was pre-
sented at the ÖGPW Tag der Politikwissenschaft, Univer-
sity of Graz, Austria, 30 November 2012. We are deeply in-
debted to Michael Lewis-Beck for his encouragement and
guidance throughout the process of this research. Finally,
we thank the two anonymous referees for their helpful
comments. All errors remain our own.
J. Aichholzer, J. Willmann / International Journal of Forecasting 30 (2014) 55–64 63Table A.1
Vote shares of the two main parties and model variables.
Election SPOE OEVP V U I-SPOE I-OEVP I (both) E
2008 29.26 25.98 55.24 6.2 1 1 1 17
2006 35.34 34.33 69.67 7.3 0 1 0 16
2002 36.51 42.30 78.81 6.1 0 1 0 15
1999 33.15 26.91 60.06 7.2 1 1 1 14
1995 38.06 28.29 66.35 6.5 1 1 1 13
1994 34.92 27.67 62.59 6.8 1 1 1 12
1990 42.78 32.06 74.84 5.0 1 1 1 11
1986 43.12 41.30 84.42 4.8 1 0 0 10
1983 47.65 43.22 90.87 3.7 1 0 0 9
1979 51.03 41.90 92.93 2.1 1 0 0 8
1975 50.42 42.95 93.37 1.5 1 0 0 7
1971 50.04 43.11 93.15 2.4 1 0 0 6
1970 48.42 44.69 93.11 2.8 0 1 0 5
1966 42.56 48.35 90.91 2.7 1 1 1 4
1962 44.00 45.43 89.43 2.7 1 1 1 3
1959 44.79 44.19 88.98 5.1 1 1 1 2
1956 43.04 45.96 89.00 5.4 1 1 1 1
1953 42.11 41.26 83.37 7.5 1 1 1 0
Notes: V = combined vote share, U = unemployment rate (y− 1), I = previous incumbency, and E = index of election.Table A.2
Forecast model estimates for the combined vote share (incumbency effect estimated separately).
OLS estimates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b (S.E.) b (S.E.) b (S.E.) b (S.E.)
Incumbency SPOE −4.45 −11.60**** 0.68
(7.77) (2.19) (5.46)
Incumbency OEVP −14.87** −10.17**** −2.52
(6.47) (2.24) (4.36)
Unemployment rate (y− 1) −2.00*** 1.41 1.73*
(0.55) (1.41) (0.81)
Election no. (index 1953= 0) −1.71**** −1.76**** −1.74****
(0.17) (0.15) (0.14)
Unemployment · Incumbency SPOE −2.29* −2.16****
(0.97) (0.31)
Unemployment · Incumbency OEVP −1.92 −2.53****
(1.12) (0.46)
Constant term 95.40**** 122.05**** 106.88**** 105.87****
(9.39) (3.10) (6.30) (1.84)
R2 0.26 0.96 0.97 0.97
Adj. R2 0.16 0.94 0.96 0.96
SEE 11.80 3.11 2.64 2.48
MAE 8.94 2.25 1.79 1.80
AIC 142.67 96.04 91.13 87.87
BIC 145.34 100.50 97.37 92.32
D–W statistic 0.39 2.24 2.58 2.50
n 18 18 18 18
Note: Two-tailed significance.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
**** p < 0.001.Appendix
See Tables A.1 and A.2.
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